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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF LEROY 
CHAPl\lAN, PETITION FOR A 
WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
\ 
- vs.- ! 
~IARCEI~L GRAH.A_M, Warden, 
State Prison, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case 
No. 8147 
Brief of App~llant 
STATEMENT OF FA_crrs 
LeRoy Chapman 'vas received at the Utah State 
Prison on August 23rd, 1950, (R. 56) under sentence 
and commitment for a term of not less than one nor 
more than twenty years for the crime of burglary in 
the second degree. (R. 55) At the time of his incar-
ceration and for years prior thereto, 1943-1945 (R. 19), 
Chapman had suffered from a residual poliomyelitis of 
the right arm and hand; he was unable to flex the wrist 
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and oppose the thumb. (Ex. 2) On July 14th, 1952, 
Chapman was granted a parole from the prison, one 
of the reasons for parole being his desire to have an 
operation on the disabled hand and arm. (R. 17) Chap-
man was permitted to leave the State of Utah for thiH 
specific purpose. (R. 27) In January of 1953, he entered 
the Mayo Clinic at Rochester, Minnesota, where he 
underwent surgery for this condition on February 13th 
following. (R. 27) Approximately ten or eleven days 
thereafter, he was permitted to leave the clinic (R. 28), 
being required to return daily (R. 35) during a satis-
factory convalescence until the cast was changed on 
February 28th, 1953. (Ex. 2) That cast was to remain 
on the hand and arm for approximately three months 
and thereafter further surgery was to be performed. 
(Ex. 2) However, before that time arrived, Chapman's 
parole was revoked and he was, on April 24th, 1953, 
returned to the Utah State Prison. (R. 56) Chapman 
was charged with having violated his parole in three 
particulars: (1) In having associated with one Max 
.Jones, a former fellow inmate of the Utah State Prison; 
(R. 34) (2) in having committed a misdemeanor, slug-
ging telephones, for which he served a. thirty-five days' 
sentence; (R. 35) and (3) for having in his possession 
certain tools alleged to be burglar tools. (R. 36) Chap-
man admitted violations one and two but denied that 
the circular saw 'vith carborundum blades was a burglar 
tool such as may be used for breaking into safes, and 
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Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus was filed to 
secure Chapman's release in order that he be afforded 
further surgical ministration. It was alleged that cruel 
and inhuman punishment "ras being inflicted upon the 
petitioner in violation of Amendment VIII of the Con-
stitution of the United States of America, and Article I, 
Section 9, of the Constitution of the State of Utah; that, 
the petitioner was treated \vith unnecessary rigor in 
violation of the law, in that (a) he was taken into cus-
tody and forcibly removed from the care of his surgeon; 
(b) that he was refused and restrained from receiving 
medical attention; (c) that he was completely deprived 
of competent medical care while incarcerated in the Utah 
State Prison; (d) that the respondent, Warden Marcell 
Graham, the Board of Pardons and the Board of Correc-
tions at all times refused to permit him to consult \vith 
or be placed under the care of any competent surgeon. 
On January 4th, 1954, the District Court of the 
Third Judicial District, State of Utah, the Honorable 
Joseph G. Jeppson, Judge, found: 
THE COURT: In this matter the Court finds 
a very novel situation in that the Warden claims 
that his hands are tied and he cannot give the 
medical treatment as required, and the state con-
tends that for that reason the action against the 
Warden-! suppose by inference from you argu-
ment-might not be proper, and it might be 
proper to bring the action against the Board of 
Corrections. 
The Court is of the opinion that the action 
against the Warden is proper, even though he 
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may not be able, 'vithout the consent of the Board 
of Corrections, to give the treatment necessary. 
If the defendant is deprived of his rights, the 
Warden certainly has him in custody, and the 
actions for his dealings would properly he 
brought against the Warden, even though the 
Warden has no personal ill will, or even though 
he does not have the ability to grant the defend-
ant his rights. 
The Court finds in this case that during the 
period since the petitioner was sentenced, that 
he has acquired a need for medical care, and the 
evidence is uncontroverted and clear that there 
is need for medical treatment, or he will suffer 
a loss in the use of his arm and hand. 
The Court is of the opinion that a continued 
incarceration must be accompanied by a reason-
able medical treatment, and that in this case, the 
petitioner is deprived of that treatment; that 
being deprived of it is a violation of his right; 
that it constitutes cruel and inhuman treatment 
and is illegal and unconstitutional. 
The Court further finds from the evidence 
that it constitutes a punishment on the part of 
the State for the violation of his parole by deny-
ing him medical treatment in view of the fact 
that the need arose during the period of his 
parole. 
The Court finds that it is improper. The Writ 
of Habeas Corpus is granted, and it is ordered 
that the petitioner be released and discharged 
forth,vith. (R. 76, 77) 
rrhereafter, on the 29th day of January, 1954, the 
court entered its formal Findings of Fact, Conclusions 
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of La\Y and Order. (R. 81, 82) The Attorney General 
for and on behalf of the respondent and of the State of 
Utah takes this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN HOLDING THAT 
THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS WAS A PROPER 
REMEDY FOR REVIEW OF PETITIONER'S COM-
PLAINTS ABOUT INCIDENTS OF PRISON MAN-
AGEl\,fENT SINCE COURTS HAVE NO FUNCTION 
TO SUPERINTEND THE TREATMENT OF PRIS-
ONERS IN THE STATE PENITENTIARY. 
POINT II 
THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN FINDING THAT 
THE PETITIONER WAS DEPRIVED OF REASON-
ABLE MEDICAL TREATMENT IN VIOLATION OF 
HIS CONSTITUTIONAL.RIGHTS. 
POINT III 
THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN FINDING THAT 
PETITIONER WAS SUBJECTED TO CRUEL AND 
INHUMAN TREATMENT, AND, THAT THE AL-
LEGED REFUSAL OF MEDICAL ATTENTION 
WAS AN ADDITIONAL PUNISHMENT FOR PETI-
TIONER'S HAVING VIOLATED HIS PAROLE. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN HOLDING THAT 
THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS WAS A PROPER 
REMEDY FOR REVIEW OF PETITIONER'S COM-
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PLAINTS ABOUT INCIDENTS OF PRISON MAN-
AGEMENT SINCE COURTS HAVE NO FUNCTION 
TO SUPERINTEND THE TREATMENT OF PRIS-
ONERS IN THE STATE PENITENTIARY. 
The Board of Pardons and the Board of Corrections 
were created by, and look for their authority to, the 
Constitution of the State of Utah. 
Section 12 of Article VII, Constitution of Utah, 
created the Board of Pardons and declared that, ''until 
otherwise provided by law" the Governor, Justices of 
the Supreme Court and the Attorney General should 
have the right to commute punishments and grant par-
dons. Section 13 of Article VII, Constitution of Utah 
established, ''until otherwise provided by law,'' the 
Board of Prison Commissioners. The Governor, Secre-
tary of State and Attorney General were named to 
constitute this board and were charged with supervision 
of all matters in connection with the State Prison. By 
legislative enactment, the present Board of Pardons has 
succeeded the constitutionally established board, Sec. 
77-62-2, U.C.A. 1953; and, the present Board of Cor-
rections has succeeded the constitutionally established 
Board of Prison Commissioners, Sec. 64-9-2, U.C.A. 
1953. These boards have now the constitutional powers 
and duties of their ·predecessors. 
Title 64, Chapter 9, U.C.A. 1953, declares the law 
of this State pertaining to the establishment, mainten-
ance and regulation of the Utah State Prison. The 
powers of the Board of Corrections and of the Board 
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of Pardons are therein enumerated and defined, Sec. 
64-9-2, U.C.A. 1953. The Legislature enacted these la,vs 
to direct those charged with constitutional duty for the 
operation of the Prison and the management thereof. 
Our Legislature has at no time conferred upon the 
courts of this State any responsibility for the operation 
of the prison and, in the absence of a constitutional 
amendment, could not, by so doing, deprive either the 
Board of Corrections or the Board of Pardons of their 
authority in that respect. We find no Utah decision 
wherein it has been held that the writ of habeas corpus 
may be availed of to secure the release of a prisoner 
on the ground that confinement in the State Prison was 
impairing his health. Our court has held: 
In habeas corpus proceedings, nothing is in-
quired into except the legality of the restraint. 
Jones v. Moore, 61 Utah 383, 213 P. 191, 193. 
If the issue here is a matter of first impression in this 
jurisdiction, such is not the case elsewhere and the 
question has been no stranger in other courts and has 
often been adjudicated. The Criminal Court of Appeals 
of Oklahoma said: 
Without stating our conclusions upon the 
question of fact as to the actual physical condition 
of the petitioner, we deem it only necessary to 
state that in a habeas corpus proceeding, where 
no question is raised as to the validity of a judg-
ment upon which a commitment is based, but the 
only question involved is one of fact as to the 
health of the accused, that such question involves 
a matter of clemency to be addressed to the 
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Governor. Since the petitioner may again seek 
clemency at the hands of the Governor, it is not 
proper that we express an opinion as to this 
man's physical condition, as such question is a 
question for the sole determination of the chief 
executive in whom the power to extend clemenry 
is vested. * * * · 
* * * Art. 6, Sec. 10, Oklahoma Constitution, 
Okl. St. Ann. Const., provides: ''The Governor 
shall have the power to grant, after conviction, 
rep~ieves, commutations, paroles, and pardons 
for all offenses, except cases of impeachment, 
upon such conditions and with such restrictions 
and limitations as he may deem proper, subject 
to such regulations as may be prescribed by 
law. * * *" 
We have held in Ex Parte Ridley, 3 Okla., Cr. 
350, 106 P. 549, 26 L.R.A., N .S., 110, in one of 
the early opinions of this court by Judge Doyle, 
that under this constitutional provision, the Gov-
ernor has exclusive power to parole a convict, 
with such restrictions and limitations as he may 
deem proper; and any law which restricted this 
·power would be unconstitutional and void. This 
case further held that under our Constitution, it 
is the duty and prerogative of the legislative de-
partment to define crime and fix the maximum 
and minimum penalty, and to fix by law the kind 
and manner of punishment, and provide such 
disciplinary regulation for prisoners, not in con-
flict with the fundamental law, as the legislature 
deems best. It is the duty of the judiciary depart-
ment to try offenders against those laws, and 
upon conviction to sentence them under the sta-
tute. That after a conviction has become final, 
it is not within the functions of the courts or legis-
lature to interfere with the pardoning power of 
the chief executive. 
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Coburn v. Schroeder, (1941), 112 P. 2d 191. 
It was held in Plalek v. Aderhold,. Warden, C.C.A. 5th 
Circuit, 73 F. 2d 173, that: 
* * * the court has no power to interfere with the 
conduct of the prison or its discipline, but only 
on habeas corpus to deliver from the prison those 
who are illegally detained there. * * * 
The holding in Platek v. Aderhold, supra, was followed 
and affirmed in Sarshik v. Sanford, 142 F. 2d 676. In 
California, where the petitioner alleged ill health, the 
court held that the questions raised were medical, sci en-
tific and administrative rather than judicial. The peti-
tion for the writ of habeas corpus was denied, Kauble v. 
Haynes, (1946), 64 Fed. Supp. 153. In Edmondson v. 
Warden, (1949), 69 A. 2d 919, the court held that habeas 
corpus was not a remedy for review of complaints about 
incidents of prison management and that the Board of 
Corrections there had full power and control over the 
House of Corrections. The United States District Court 
for West Virginia in the case of Un.ited States ex rel 
Bowe, et al. v. Skeen, (1952), 107 Fed. Supp. 879, said: 
* * * The petition should be dismissed * * * the 
'vrit of habeas corpus cannot be used to correct 
alleged mistreatment by prison authorities of 
prisoners subject to valid judgment and commit-
ment. * * * 
We contend, for this Point I, that it must be pre-
sumed that the Board of Corrections is properly exer-
cising its authority in the operation of the prison and 
that the judiciary of this State should be hesitant to 
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substitute their judgment for that of the Board where 
the result becomes an infringement upon the executive 
branch of government. There is a remedy in the courts 
which may be availed of to control and restrain govern-
ment agencies when such restraint or control is neces-
sary or desirable; we do not think that remedy, in such 
as the instant case, to be the writ of habeas corpus. 
POINT II 
THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN FINDING THAT 
THE PETITIONER WAS DEPRIVED OF REASON-
ABLE MEDICAL TREATMENT IN VIOLATION OF 
HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS. 
The evidence does not sustain the finding of the 
court below. 
Norman L. Beck, M.D., orthopedic surgeon, and a 
witness for petitioner testified that he first saw the 
petl.tioner on June 3, 1953, (R. 12), in fact, the petitioner 
had been examined by Dr. Beck in March of 1952. (R. 
13, 22) Subsequent to June 3, 1953, the petitioner was 
attended by Dr. Beck on June 24th, ~July 6th and Sep-
tember 21st, 1953. (R. 15) The doctor recommended 
further surgery on petitioner's hand ''without too great 
delay'' ; ( R. 18) he had made his report to the Board 
of Corrections. (R. 19) The Board of Corrections had 
been informed by this witness in June of 1953 that a 
delay in the performance of surgery of six or eight 
months would not be too long, (R. 20) and the doctor 
could not answer yes or no at the hearing as to what 
10 
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the exact time would be that would constitute too great 
a delay. (R. 20) X-rays taken on July 6th, 1953, showed 
that the bone in petitioner's hand was completely fused 
and that under such circumstances, there should be no 
discomfort. (R. 23) The doctor concluded by testifying 
that he was willing to perform the necessary surgery 
with petitioner's consent and cooperation and that it 
would not be necessary that the petitioner be released 
from th~ penitentiary during convalescence therefrom. 
(R. 24, 25) 
LeRoy Chapman, the petitioner, on his own behalf 
testified that his requests for medical attention subse-
quent to his return to the prison had been constantly 
denied, (R. 31) but, he then said that he was told to 
abide by the decision of the prison physician and he 
was "constantly referred to Dr. Jones." (R. 31) The 
petitioner admitted of his appointments with Dr. Beck 
(R. 31) and admitted further that it was not his inten-
tion nor desire to have the necessary surgery performed 
in Utah, (R. 32) also that he had never consented to 
have the surgery performed in Utah. (R. 37) 
J. 0. Jones, M.D., prison physician, testified that 
he attended the petitioner at the prison dispensary on 
several occasions and that he did not think that at any 
time the need for surgery in this case had been impera-
tive. (R. 42) The doctor testified that he gave his per-
mission for the petitioner to consult Dr. Beck. (R. 47) 
Andrew Unamuno, medical officer at the Utah State 
Prison, testified that to his knowledge the petitioner had 
11 
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never been refused attention at the infirmary; (R. 48) 
that he received what treatment he requested. (R. 52) 
Marcell Graham, warden, testified that he had never 
interferred with the petitioner's receiving medical atten-
tion; (R. 58, 61) that the petitioner had refused to have 
the surgery performed by Dr. Beck; (R. 59) that the 
Board of Corrections would permit petitioner the opera-
tion if he, the petitioner, would pay for it. (R. 66, 71) 
Warden Graham had interceded on petitioner's behalf 
before the Board of Pardons and the Board of Cor-
rections. (R. 74) 
For Point II we contend that the petitioner was not 
denied reasonable medical attention and further that the 
State of Utah was under no obligation to provide the 
petitioner with the facilities of the Mayo Clinic at Ro-
chester, Minnesota; nor, for that matter, to expend state 
funds for an operation locally, under the circumstances 
in this case, even had petitioner consented thereto. We 
cannot subscribe to any such proposition that an offer 
of payment for the operation by some third person 
should or could be a reason for, a consideration for, or 
an excuse for, the granting of the writ of habeas corpus. 
POINT III 
THE COURT BELOvV ERRED IN FINDING THAT 
PETITIONER WAS SUBJECTED TO CRUEL AND 
INHUMAN TREA.TMENT, AND, THAT THE AL-
LEGED REFUSAL OF MEDICAL ATTENTION 
WAS AN ADDITIONAL PUNISHMENT FOR PETl 
TIONER'S HAVING VIOLATED HIS PAROLE. 
12 
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Amendment VIII of the Constitution of the United 
States declares: 
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor ex-
cessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual 
punishments inflicted. 
Article I, Section 9, of the Constitution of the State 
of Utah reads : 
Excessive bail shall not be required; excessive 
fines shall not be imposed; nor shall cruel and 
unusual punishments be inflicted. Persons ar-
rested or imprisoned shall not be treated with 
unnecessary rigor. 
The petitioner complains that he was subjected to 
cruel and inhuman punishment and treated with unneces-
sary rigor. (R. 1) The court found that being deprived 
of reasonable medical treatment constituted cruel and 
inhuman treatment and treatment 'vith unnecessary 
rigor. (R. 82) 
It has been held that the term "cruel and unusual 
punishment'' applies to something inhuman and barbar-
ous, torture and the like. In Re Ward, 295 Mich. 7 42, 
746, 295 N.W. 483. People v. Sarnoff, 302 Mich. 266, 4 
N.W. 2d 544. In the case of Smith v. Command, (Mich.) 
204 N.W. 140, 40 A.L.R. 525, 527, Weist, J., dissenting, 
had this to say: 
In examining the subject of cruel and unusual 
punishments, I have been surprised at the dearth 
of adjudications. This fact, however, speaks well 
for American legislation. It must be assumed 
13 
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that the framers of the Bill of Rights had knowl-
edge of former cruel and unusual punishments, 
whether adjudged under some law or imposed by 
despotic and arbitrary power. They knew of 
quartering, of slitting the nose and cropping the 
ears, of nailing the tongue to a post, of crucifixion, 
of flogging at the cart's tail, of disemboweling, 
cutting off hands, .and of branding, of castration, 
of burning, of peine forte et dure, of the rack and 
thumbscrews, etc., and they emphatically said, 
''Never again.'' 
Examples of cruel and unusual punishments were re-
ferred to in the case of Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 
135 as: 
* * * Where the prisoner was drawn or dragged 
to the place of execution, in treason; or where 
he was emboweled alive, beheaded, and quartered, 
in high treason. * * =K, public dissection in murder, 
and burning alive in treason committed by a 
female. * * * 
Mr. Justice McKenna discusses the subject at length 
in Weems v. U. 8., 217 U.S. 349, 368 et seq., and gives 
a.n interesting historical dissertation thereon. 
In searching the case law for a determination of 
what constitutes cruel and unusual punishment we have 
found numerous decisions. It becomes apparent upon 
reading these cases that there is no hard and fast defini-
tive rule and that the circumstances of each individual 
case must determine whether punishment is cruel or 
unusual within the meaning of the constitutional provi-
14 
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s1ons. (*Without comment thereon we cite in a footnote 
some of the decisions we feel to be pertinent to the case 
at bar.) The extreme cruel and unusual punishments to 
\Vhich we have hereinabove referred to are, we appre-
ciate, archaic and such punishments \Vere resorted to 
when the fundamental idea back of the criminal law was 
one of vengeance. The old l\tlosaic doctrine of ''an eye 
for an eye and a tooth for a tooth'' no longer prevails 
and such cases read, to us of the present generation, like 
scenes from the Inferno of Dante. However, though it 
be admitted that all punishments are in some sense cruel, 
since punishment imports pain or suffering, the Con-
stitution does not mean that crime for this reason is 
to go unpunished. 
It has been held that punishment will not be de-
clared excessive because confinement might undermine 
the health of an accused, State v. Van Klaveren, (Iowa 
1929), 226 N.W. 81, wherein that court said: 
* * * the only thing properly coming before us 
for our consideration is the punishment which 
"\Vas inflicted by the court, which the defendant 
alleges is excessive. The motion of the defendant 
is supported by the affidavits of himself and wife 
and a physician. Their affidavits are to the effect 
that the defendant is not in the prime of health 
and that a long period of confinement in the 
county jail might undermine his health and lead 
*U. S. v. Ragen, 54 Fed. Supp. 973; In Re Pinaire, 46 Fed. Supp. 
113; In Re Calhoun, 94 N.E. 2d 388; Delnegro v. State, 81 A. 2d 
241; Geurin v. City of Little Rock, 155 S.W. 2d 719; Harp.er v. 
Wall, 85 Fed. Supp. 783; Ex Parte Pickens, 101 Fed. Supp. 285; 
Siegel, et al., v. Ragen, et al., 88 Fed. Supp. 996. 
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to serious consequences. It is sufficient to say 
that a period of confinement by way of imprison-
ment might weaken the condition of a healthy 
man, and that many men now in good health will 
pass into eternity before the expiration of the 
period of imprisonment given to the defendant, 
but that is not sufficient reason why the guilty 
should not be punished. * * * 
To the _record in the case at bar: The petitioner, 
Chapman, 'vas being restrained of his liberty by the 
defendant at the Utah State Prison under a lawful com-
mitment and order of the District Court of the Second 
Judicial District of the State of Utah. He had been 
paroled from that institution on July 14th, 1952, upon 
his application therefor so that he might obtain surgical 
care for his disabled arm and hand. (R. 26) In January 
of 1953, petitioner entered Mayo Clinic at Rochester, 
Minnesota, for that purpose; (R. 27) whereat he was 
receiving the finest attention he had ever had. (R. 35) 
However, he was unable to avoid the toils of the law, 
( R. 35, 36) or to live up to the terms of his parole. (R. 
34, 35, 36) Consequently, he found himself, on April 
24th, 1953, back in prison and the second phase of his 
surgical need not yet accomplished. The refusal of the 
Board of Pardons to again parole petitioner or to have 
the second opera.tion performed at the Mayo Clinic in 
Rochester, Minnesota, at state expense is the cruel a;nd 
unusual punishment and treatrnent with u,nnecessary 
rigor of which petitioner complains. There is nothing 
in the record to indicate that petitioner received treat-
ment while incarcerated in the Utah State Penitentiary 
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different than that afforded any other inmate of the 
prison. There is nothing in the record which indicates 
that petitioner suffered physical discomfort, to the con-
trary, his witness, Doctor N. R. Beck, testified to the 
effect that 'vhere the fusion of the bone was complete, 
there should be no discomfort. (R. 23) The petitioner 
was not assigned work at the prison which was not 
within his physical capabilities. (R. 42) He was never 
refused attention at the prison infirmary. (R. 48) The 
warden had never interfered with the petitioner receiv-
ing medical attention. (R. 58, 61, 62) The petitioner 
refused to have the operation performed in Utah, (R. 
32, 37, 59) although Dr. N. R. Beck of this city was 
qualified (Ex. 2) and willing to proceed. (R. 24) If 
petitioner \vould have consented to having the surgery 
performed here, the matter could then have been pre-
sented to the Board of Corrections for their determina-
tion. (R. 74) 
For this Point III, we hold that the record does not 
sustain a finding that petitioner was subjected to cruel 
and inhuman (unusual) treatment and treatment with 
unnecessary rigor. On the contrary, the reeord shows 
conclusively that petitioner was afforded every consid-
eration by the penal authorities, all of them. There is 
no evidence of abuse or mistreatment. There is evidence 
of compassion (his parole), of consideration (work as-
signments), of care (medical attention), and of solici-
tude (the warden's efforts on his behalf \vith both the 
authorities and with petitioner's family). Society has 
n-ot neglected its obligation to the petitioner; but society 
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has been imposed upon, and taken advantage of, through 
his release. 
CONCLUSION 
Courts should, of course, exercise their power to 
prevent any inhuman or cruel treatment, when properly 
called upon so to do, of those unfortunate enough to be 
confined in jails. But the courts should not hamper 
officials charged with the duty of maintaining prisons 
and having custody of those convicted of crimes by 
interfering with the regulation or management thereof 
in the absence of unreasonable or capricious conduct or 
the neglect of duty. We are unaware of any legitimate 
complaint heretofore directed to the management of 
Utah's modern and excellent State Prison. 
The Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Order of the lower court should be set aside and held 
for naught; and, the cause should be remanded with 
directions to the court below to return the petitioner 
to the custody of the warden. 
Respectfully submitted, 
E. R. CALLISTER 
Attorney General 
WALTER L. BUDGE 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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